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OIR Proposed Substitute for paragraphs 5, 6 and 7

5. The Kremlin is evidently not satisfied with the success it has so far achieved in its efforts to realize its immediate objective of preventing the Western powers from shifting in their favor the present balance of conventional military power in being. It has over the past several months shown increasing concern over (a) US domestic mobilization; (b) military developments within the North Atlantic Treaty organization; (c) finalization of US plans for a separate treaty with Japan, which in the Kremlin view would be almost synonymous with the beginning of Japanese rearmament; (d) the extension and development of US overseas bases; (e) the continuing prospect of Western German rearmament; (f) failure of French and Italian Communists to develop sufficient strength in recent elections to force a change in the current foreign policies of the governments; (g) the apparent likelihood that Greece and Turkey will be included in NATO; and (h) the growing prospect that Yugoslavia will be drawn into the Western defense system as a result of US military support of the Tito regime.

6. We believe the Kremlin probably intends, as a postlude to a cease-fire in Korea, to attempt to create a more favorable international climate and through this to secure, either by Western default on specific agreement the following immediate aims that would together mean attainment of the immediate Soviet objective: (a) Western abandonment of their plans for a separate treaty with Japan; (b) rapid withdrawal of UN troops from Korea and US acceptance of a formula for the unification of Korea that will insure ultimate Communist control of the entire country;

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(c) US abandonment of Formosa to the Chinese Communists; (d) admission of Communist China to the UN; (e) Western "guarantees" with regard to West German rearmament; (f) the virtual scrapping of the North Atlantic Treaty system; (g) a "general disarmament" formula that would preclude the West from closing the present gap in conventional military strength; and (h) a "peace pact" that would place the Western powers under a grave moral handicap any future efforts to combat Communist aggression. We further believe that until the Kremlin has explored fully the possibility of achieving these aims through a "reduction of international tensions" approach, it will not resort to new direct or indirect aggressions, or to other forms of overt pressure.

7. We are unable to estimate whether the Western powers will be induced by this Soviet campaign to satisfy, by default or specific agreement, the above listed Soviet demands. We do estimate, however, that the Kremlin probably calculates that there are good prospects that ^{this} will in fact be the case. Factors that would contribute to such a Kremlin calculation are: (a) the demonstrated anxiety of the Western powers to end the Korean conflict on terms short of their stated objectives; (b) the close identification by the Western powers of their military preparedness measures with threats inherent in continued armed Communist aggression in Korea; (c) known differences among the Western powers as to the urgency of the need to develop Western military strength; (d) fear of war in the West and the prevalence of popular pressure for peace at almost any price; and (e) "crises" within the major Western countries over foreign policy issues.

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8. If the Western powers should accept, by default or specific agreement, the Soviet demands with respect to their military preparedness program, we believe that the danger of a deliberate Soviet resort to general war would be substantially reduced. We believe further, however, that such a change in Western policy would immediately be followed by intensified and increasingly militant Soviet efforts to establish its hegemony first over all Europe and Asia and subsequently over the entire world.

9. Failure of the Western powers to abandon, by default or specific agreement, the major elements of their military preparedness program would result in an immediate increase in Soviet concern over this program. We believe that as the program was effectively implemented, the Soviet rulers would view it as the prelude to an imminent military showdown between East and West. Under this circumstance, there is a possibility that the Soviet rulers might themselves precipitate general war at the time they considered most favorable. A Kremlin decision to this effect could as well be taken within the period under review as at a later date. If the Soviet leaders did not decide to precipitate general war, we believe they still would adopt a program designed to maximize their immediate readiness for the impending conflict. These moves would almost certainly include rapid full-scale manpower and economic mobilization of the Soviet Union and the satellites. They probably would also include systematic efforts to disrupt Western military efforts through precipitation of civil conflict in Western countries. At the same time, the Kremlin might well undertake local direct and indirect aggressions aimed at improving the immediate strategic position of the USSR.

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